Monday, April 9, 2012
Who should file the Foreign Filing License (FFL) under section 39 of the Patents Act, 1970?
Sunday, January 1, 2012
Is India really a First-to-File System?
Monday, October 31, 2011
Grounds of Opposition [s.25] v. Grounds for Revocation [s.64] under The Patents Act, 1970
Monday, July 11, 2011
Requirement under Section 8 of Patents Act, 1970: Could it be a PPH in guise?
Monday, May 9, 2011
Deemed: Withdrawal v. Abandonment
This should be the prequel to my earlier post on section 137 and 138, where I discussed the scope and applicability of these sections along with the issue of as to whether the delay in entering national phase in India could be condoned by the Patent Office. Here I would like to make out a clearer distinction between ‘deemed withdrawal of Patent Application’ and ‘deemed abandonment of Patent Application’ as per the Patents Act, 1970.
Although, at times, in general usage, withdrawal and abandonment are used synonymously, their connotations are quite different especially in legal terminology. The dictionary meaning of the word abandoned refers to - give up, surrender, leave or desert; while the meaning of term withdrawal is provided as – to take away or to remove oneself from participation. Thus, it appears that the term ‘withdrawal’ has an element of an action taken (with a presumably clear intent) to effectuate the withdrawal, whereas the ‘abandonment’ is an effect of failure (intentional or otherwise) to take any required action. Let us see the usage of these two terms in the Act:
As per the Act, a patent application is deemed to be abandoned in following cases:
- Section 9 – where the failure to file the complete specification within time (viz. within 12 months from provisional) results in the application to be treated as ‘deemed to be abandoned’;
- Section 21 – where the application is ‘deemed to be abandoned’ if the Applicant fails to put the application in order for grant within 1 year of the issuance of FER; and
- Section 40 – where the application is deemed to be abandoned if any person fails to comply with any direction as to secrecy given by the Controller under section 35, or makes or causes to be made an application for grant of a patent outside India in contravention of section 39.
Thus it is observed that the Abandonment is the effect of failure of the applicant to do o comply with something which he is required to do as per the Act in order to obtain a patent.
With regard to the use of ‘deemed withdrawal of the application’, the Act uses the phrase only at two instances:
Firstly, in section 11B(4), where the application is deemed to be withdrawn if a request for examination (RFE) is not filed within 48 months period from the date of priority; and
Secondly, Rule 22 of the Patent Rules which says that an international application designating India shall be deemed to be withdrawn if the applicant does not comply with the requirements of rule 20. Rule 20, along with other basic requirements, specify the deadline to enter PCT national phase in India to be 31 months from priority.
These two provisions for deemed withdrawal are in addition to the actual withdrawal provision [section 11B(4)(i)] wherein the applicant can withdraw its patent application anytime before the grant (and atleast 3 months before the publication to withdraw without prejudice). It must be observed that although the above mentioned provisions for ‘deemed withdrawal’ also deals with failure of Applicant to comply with the deadlines, they are still termed as withdrawal instead of abandonment. The reason behind the use of term withdrawal instead of abandonment, could be to confer ‘an intention not to proceed’ on part of the applicant and making such failure equivalent to a positive action taken by applicant to withdraw the application instead of counting it as a mere failure (which could either be intentional or un-intentional, and accordingly could be condonable in certain circumstances if delay is justified and unintentional). These, in practice, are the two strictest deadlines in the Act, which are not condonable by any authority. Therefore, I believe that the terms ‘withdrawal’ and ‘abandonment’ are used judiciously in the Act, not with respect to the cause but with respect to the effect.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
Does the Patents Act, 1970, provides for deemed publication of patent application?
The present analysis pertains to the quid aspect of the hackneyed phrase “Patent System is a quid pro quo”. Much ink has been spilt over the understanding that the patent system rests on the hinges of a bargain between the Inventor and the Public, wherein the inventor discloses his invention to the public (quid), thereby contributing to the research and development, against which (pro) he gets limited exclusivity to practice the invention (quo). In such system, making an invention open to the public is not only a critical but an indispensable module, which basically constitutes one part of the bargain in itself.
The words ‘published’ or ‘publication’ and the phrase ‘open to the public’ are not defined in the Patents Act, 1970. In-fact these seemingly synonymous terms are actually not synonymous to each other and seems to have been used quite judiciously in the Act to confer their respective meanings. Although the term ‘Publication’ is defined in section 3 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which could be termed as pari materia for the Patents Act, 1970, but it would be unjustified to import that definition for the purposes of Patents as the significance of the term varies significantly among these two statutes. The bone of contention here is - whether a patent application is deemed to be in public merely by the efflux of stipulated time period (of 18 months) and the publication of application in the Patents Journal is a mere formality; or the application is considered to be published only upon the actual publication in the Official Journal.
Section 11 A (1) of the Patents Act, 1970 provides that “Save as otherwise provided, no application for patent shall ordinarily be open to the public for such period as may be prescribed” (emphasis provided). The time period is provided in Rule 24 of the Patents Rules, 2003, which states as:
“The period for which an application for patent shall not ordinarily be open to public under sub-section (1) of section 11A shall be eighteen months from the date of filing of application or the date of priority of the application, whichever is earlier” (emphasis provided)
Thus there is clear consistency about the use of word ‘open to public’. The usage of the phrase ‘open to public’ makes out a clear inference that the ‘open to public’ becomes operative, automatically, as soon as 18 months period expires. This is different from the ‘publication’ which means literal publication in the Patents Journal and which has no effect on the operation of the ‘open to public’ clause. This is evident from the fact that the same Rule 24 has a proviso which states that:
PROVIDED that the period within which the Controller shall publish the application in the Journal shall ordinarily be one month from the date of expiry of said period, or one month from the date of request for publication under rule 24A
The use of phrase ‘open to public’ and the word publish/publication in the same clause (Rule 24) clearly reflects that the legislature intentionally used the different terminology to confer different meanings thereto. At all other instances in the Act and Rules justifiably uses the word publish/publication only.
It is further evident from the fact that the proviso was added only in 2006 and then it became imperative upon the Controller to publish the application within 1 month of the expiry of the period. It cannot be said that before the characterization of this proviso, the applications were not used to be open to public after expiry of 18 months. Still, at several instances, due to technical glitches or mishandling, there are several applications which do not get published in the Patent Journal within 1 month of the expiry of the 18 month period. In effect, such applications are open to public but are not published and the applicant as well as public will be devoid of any and all rights and liabilities with respect to that application which arises only upon the actual publication in the Patent Journal. However, in a very idealistic situation, a very pro-active competitor who somehow keeps track of the filings by an individual/organization should be able to file a request for inspection and be inspect the file upon payment of requisite fee after the application is open to public even though it is not published. In this regard, section 11A(6)(b) provides that:
Upon publication of an application for a patent under this section—
the patent office may, on payment of such fee as may be prescribed, make the specification and drawings, if any, of such application available to the public. (emphasis provided)
Firstly, it provides that the patent office may make the specification and drawing available to public. This ‘may’ should be treated as shall here otherwise it will greatly prejudice the provisions of pre-grant opposition wherein ‘any person’ can file a pre-grant opposition and for that these details are usually necessary. As per section Section 11A (5) of the Act, the Publication must include “date of application, number of application, name and address of the applicant identifying the application and an abstract”. An abstract may not provide sufficient details to file a pre-grant opposition and the Patent Office cannot refuse the availability of the specification and drawings. Secondly, merely stating that upon publication the specification is available to public does not rule out the possibility that it cannot be before literal publication in the Patent Journal. The use of word ‘publication’ is due to presumption that there is no other source of information available to the general public that such an application has been filed and thus a request for inspection could be filed only after the publication.
Finally, as per section section 11A(7) of the Patents Act:
On and from the date of publication of the application for patent and until the date of grant of a patent in respect of such application, the applicant shall have the like privileges and rights as if a patent for the invention had been granted on the date of publication of the application. (emphasis provided)
These ‘like rights’ of the applicant starts from the date of publication of the application. Theoretically, it should start from the date on which the application becomes open to public viz. immediately upon expiry of the 18 months period irrespective of the publication. This is because, the rights of the applicant should start as soon as the application is in public domain and for the purpose of being available in public domain, same standards must be applicable as are for the purpose of determining the novelty, wherein, hypothetically, if something which is available on an auction in a some remote country for a very short period of time and at very stringent conditions which eventually was not bought by someone, does constitutes the prior art. Therefore, simply mentioning that the invention shall be available to public after 18 months itself is sufficient to deem it as available in public domain, automatically, after the period of 18 months and an infringer should not be able to say that it was not aware of the existence of any such patent application. However, section 111 of the Patents Act is of some relevance here, which provides as:
In a suit for infringement of a patent, damages or an account of profits shall not be granted against the defendant who proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware and had no reasonable grounds for believing that the patent existed.
On a similar note, it will well be a defence available to the infringer, atleast against the charge of damages, that atleast until the publication it had no reasonable ground to believe that such an invention has been encompassed in a patent application. Therefore, it may be practically not viable to offer such like rights to the applicant without actual publication of the application in the Patent Journal.
It can be concluded that the application is deemed to be published on the expiry of 18 months time period and any person can, upon payment of official fee, inspect the file the very next day of expiry of 18 months. [Thus ‘publication’ of an application could take place only simultaneously or after the application becomes ‘open to public’. In regular case, the application becomes open to public with expiry of 18 months and is published within 1 month by the Controller in the Patent Journal. In case a request for early publication is filed by the applicant, both the acts viz. publication of application and the application becoming open to public, takes place simultaneously.]
Thursday, March 24, 2011
Doctrine of Election: Is it applicable in Patents?
Is the 'Doctrine of Election' applicable in case of Patents? This is the bone of contention in one of the recent-most case of Dr. Aloys Wobben Vs. Shri Yogesh Mehra and Ors. [Decided on 06.12.2010] [complete judgment may be read here http://judg-mental.blogspot.com/2011/03/dr-aloys-wobben-vs-shri-yogesh-mehra.html].
Before moving onto the case and its analysis, I would like to discuss the basic tenets of the Doctrine of Election. For the applicability of the Doctrine of Election, there is a pre-requisite of the presence of three elements of election - existence of two or more remedies; inconsistencies between such remedies; and choice of one of them. All three elements are necessary and if any one of the three elements is not there, doctrine does not apply. And as per the doctrine – the petitioner can avail only one of the remedies available and not all of them simultaneously. The 'doctrine of election' is based on the rule of estoppels and thus bars a person from availing two or more remedies simultaneously.
In this case, the defendant sought for: (a) revocation/rectification of the plaintiff’s patent, in a proceeding before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), under provisions of Section 117G (basically a revocation petition under section 64 of Patents Act); and (b) cancellation of the said patent, as defence under Section 107 of the Act, before the Court, in the suit for infringement.
A revocation/rectification petition could be filed under section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970 before the IPAB. Section 117G is only with regard to the transfer of pending proceedings for revocation of patents from High Courts to the IPAB. Section 64 basically lists out 17 grounds (a-q) for revocation of patent. As per section 107, all these grounds are also available as a defence in a suit for infringement. In the present case, the plaintiff urged the court to stop the defendant from availing both the options simultaneously and relied on the doctrine of exercise.
The Hon’ble Court denied the plaintiff’s application and allowed the defendant to pursue both the remedies simultaneously. The reasoning given by the Hon’ble court is as:
“Though seemingly overlapping, the remedies may not be necessarily availed simultaneously. For instance, a post grant opposition applicant may not choose to carry the matter in appeal. A third party may be sued for infringement; either at that stage, or before, he may prefer an application before the Board for cancellation or revocation. In the event of his being sued for infringement, if his application before the Board is held to be not maintainable, or alternatively, he is asked not to raise the ground of cancellation in his written statement, his defence would be seriously prejudiced. In these circumstances, it would be contrary to statute to hold that he cannot pursue his independent statutory remedy; that would be plainly against public policy.” (emphasis provided)
The reasoning provided by the Hon’ble Court seems quite perfunctory to me. Let’s first discuss the applicability of the Doctrine of Exercise in the present case.
The remedy available in both the cases to the defendant is same (not because of the common grounds of section 64, but because of the common result) viz. the revocation/cancellation of the plaintiff’s patents. Secondly, it is quite possible that the IPAB and the High Court, while deciding upon the same issue parallely, may reach to different conclusions and issue conflicting orders (although in that case, the order of High Court shall prevail, but it will make the IPAB’s exercise perfectly futile), whereby one forum may revoke the patents and the other may upheld the validity of patents. Thirdly, in case a suit for infringement is pending against the defendant, it certainly has the choice to opt any of the options viz. to file a petition for revocation for patents at IPAB or to file a counterclaim for revocation in the suit. Thus, it seems that the doctrine should be applicable in the present case.
The Hon’ble Court erroneously construed it to interpret that availing of its rights before one forum will render the defendant devoid of its rights to be used before the other forum, which is certainly not the case. It is agreed that the right to file a counterclaim of revocation before High Court and right to file a petition for revocation before IPAB are statutory rights and cannot be taken away from the defendant, however, the Court could have suspended simply suspend one of the proceedings until the other one is pending, as otherwise it amounts to multiplicity of proceedings. Such an order will not take away the rights of the defendant, but will only suspend its exercising of those rights for the time being they are being pursued at a different forum. Apparently, unlike the Trade Marks Act 1999, there is no clear cut provision in the Patents Act, 1970, to this effect. Section 113 (2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1970 clearly provides that:
Where before the institution of a complaint of an offence referred to in sub-section (1), any application for the rectification of the register concerning the trade mark in question on the ground of invalidity of the registration thereof has already been properly made to and is pending before the tribunal, the court shall stay the further proceedings in the prosecution pending the disposal of the application aforesaid and shall determine the charge against the accused in conformity with the result of the application for rectification in so far as the complainant relies upon the registration of his mark. (emphasis provided)
Not only this, as per section 113(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court, if satisfied that such defence is prima facie tenable, provides 3 months time to accused to file a rectification before the Appellate Board.
Although, there are no corresponding provisions in the Patents Act, the Court can certainly decide to suspend one of the proceedings (where the rights and remedies are identical and the parties involved are also the same), in order to avoid a situation of possibly conflicting decisions. This could be further extended to a hypothetical situation, where within one year period of grant of patent, a person (interested) could file - a post-grant opposition under section 25(2) (to be decided by the Opposition Board); a petition for revocation of patent under section 64 (to be decided by the IPAB); and supposing a case of infringement has been filed by the Patentee against the person, he can also file a counterclaim of revocation under section 107 (based on any ground under section 64) (which matter than will be decided by the High Court). The grounds under section 25(2) and section 64 are almost similar with very minor changes.
Thus, in such situation, it is very much possible that the person is seeking same remedy viz. revocation of patents, effectively before three different forums, while relying on the same grounds. If allowed to proceed simultaneously, the outcome could be three different decisions by three different forums. The Hon’ble Court, therefore, ought to have suspended one of the proceeding, until pendency of the other.